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Recent Issues in Litigation Under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act
NORMAN B. SMITH* AND L. POE LEGGETTE**
This Article is a survey and analysis of the issues that arise in age
discrimination suits in the federal courts. Its content reflects a litigator's
interests: procedural questions, burdens of persuasion, problems of proof,
and measures of damages. Its organization reflects a litigator's bias. We
begin with an overview of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA or the Act)' since it is, of course, the basis for age discrimination
cases. The remaining topics are arranged roughly in the order in which a
lawyer would encounter them in preparing for litigation: first, the
"procedural prerequisites" to a suit; second, the demands for a jury trial
and damages (since they must be made in the pleadings); and, finally, the
most frequently raised issues of substance and proof encountered at trial.
I. SCOPE AND COVERAGE UNDER THE AMENDED ACT
A. General Provisions
The ADEA applies to "employers," a term that includes all private
employers engaged in commerce who have twenty or more employees,2
and to the states and their agencies and subdivisions.3 It also applies to
labor organizations that operate in industries affecting commerce4 and to
employment agencies.' The Act prohibits employment notices or
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I. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act is codified in 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976). The
substantive provisions are located in § 623, the definitions in § 630, and the exceptions to unlawful
practices in § 623(0. Citations in the text are to the section numbers of the Act rather than the
codification.
2. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1976).
3. Id.
4. 29 U.S.C. § 630(d) (1976). A labor organization is defined as
a labor organization engaged in an industry affecting interstate commerce, and any agent of
such an organization, and includes any organization of any kind, any agency, or employee
representation committee, group, association, or plan so engaged in which employees
participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or part, of dealing with employers
concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours, or other terms or
conditions of employment, and any conference, general committee, joint or system board, or
joint counsel so engaged which is subordinate to a national or international labor
organization.
Id.
5. 29 U.S.C. § 630(c) (1976). An employment agency is defined as "any person regularly
undertaking with or without compensation to procure employees for an employer and includes an
agent of such a person; but shall not include an agency of the United States." Id.
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advertisements that indicate a preference for persons of a certain age.6 It
also lists several practices in which employers, labor organizations, and
employment agencies may not engage. Employers generally may not fire,
refuse to hire, or treat a person unequally with respect to employment if the
unfavorable decision is based on that person's age. Employment agencies
and labor organizations are similarly forbidden to discriminate against
older workers in job referrals and membership decisions.8
There are two instances in which employers, labor organizations, and
employment agencies may lawfully make unfavorable decisions based
upon a person's age.9 The first is when age is closely related to the
requirements of a particular job-or, to use the language of the statute,
when "age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary
to the normal operation of the business."' 0 The second instance is when the
employer or labor organization is observing the terms of a bona fide
seniority system or employee plan, provided that the employer or union is
not using the plan as an excuse for forcing a worker to retire or for refusing
to hire an older worker."l
B. Recent Changes in the Act
Recent developments in the Congress, the Executive branch, and the
courts have had a major effect on four aspects of the administration and
coverage of the ADEA. These changes include (1) extension of age limits to
include a greater number of people within the Act's coverage, (2)
prohibition of involuntary retirement of protected workers, (3) application
of the Act to state and local government employees, and (4) transfer of the
responsibility for administering and enforcing the Act from the
Department of Labor to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion.
1. Extension of Age Limits
The ADEA originally covered employees between the ages of forty
and sixty-five. 12 The 1978 amendments, effective January 1, 1979,
extended the maximum age to seventy, 3 but added two exceptions for
persons between sixty-five and seventy.' 4 One exception covers executive
or other high policy-making employees who are entitled to deferred
compensation benefits of at least $27,000 annually, computed as if the plan
6. 29 U.S.C. § 623(e) (1976).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1976).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 623(b), (c) (1976).
9. The Act also permits disciplinary measures taken forgood cause. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(3) (1976).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1) (1976).
11. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1976 & Supp. 1979).
12. See 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1976), amended by Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 3(a), 92 Stat. 189 (1978)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 631 (Supp. 1979)).
13. Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 3(a), 92 Stat. 189 (1978) (codified at29 U.S.C. § 631 (Supp. 1979)).
14. Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 3(a), 92 Stat. 189 (1978) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 631 (Supp. 1979)).
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were a straight-line annuity, without regard for employee or "roll-over"
contributions. 15 The other exception covers college and university
personnel with unlimited tenure contracts. 6 The latter exemption expires
on July 1, 1982.1
7
The original sections dealing with discrimination in federal govern-
ment employment did not contain age limits, 8 and the courts were divided
on whether the limits found in other sections of the Act applied to federal
employees.' 9 Although the 1978 amendments to these sections established
a minimum age of forty,2° they did not contain a maximum age provision.
As a result, it seems clear that the Act now covers all federal employees
over the age of forty.
While the revised age limits did not become effective until January 1,
1979,2' at least one district court has used an equal protection analysis to
extend the seventy-year-old age limit to an employee whose job was
threatened after the passage of the amendments but before the effective
date. In Kuhar v. Greensburg-Salem School District22 the court ruled that
an employer's attempt to force the retirement of a sixty-five-year-old
employee during the interium period placed the employee in a
classification different from other employees, and proceeded to compare
the employee's plight with that of persons retiring after the effective date of
the amendments.23 The court concluded that there was no rational
relationship between the employee's involuntary retirement and the
employer-school district's interest in educating its children, and enjoined
the employer's proposed action.24 The decision relied heavily on Congress'
decision to protect workers until they reached the age of seventy (ignoring
the fact that the new policy did not become effective until a date well after
the employer's proposed action would have been completed), 25 and on the
"unusual factual circumstances of [the] case," particularly the fact that
plaintiff was to be the last employee of the district retired under the lower
limit.26 As a result of Kuhar, the 1978 amendments for all practical
15. 29 U.S.C. § 631(c) (Supp. 1979).
16. 29 U.S.C. § 631(d) (Supp. 1979).
17. Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 3(b)(3), 92 Stat. 190 (1978).
18. See 29 U.S.C. § 633a (1976), amended by Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 5(a), 92 Stat. 191 (1978)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 633a (Supp. 1979)).
19. Compare Christie v. Marston, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 759 (7th Cir. 1977) (age limits do not
apply to federal employees), with Bevans v. Nugent, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (age
limits apply to federal as well as private sector employees).
20. Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 5(a), 92 Stat. 192 (1978) (codified at29 U.S.C. § 633a(a) (Supp. 1979)).
21. Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 3(b)(1), 92 Stat. 191 (1978). The portion of the 1976 Act applicable to
federal government employees became effective on Sept. 30, 1978. Id. § 5(0, 92 Stat. 192 (1976).
22. 466 F. Supp. 806 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
23. Id. at 997-1000.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1000.
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purposes became effective on April 6, 1978, the date the President signed
the bill.
2 7
2. The Prohibition of Involuntary Retirement
Prior to the 1978 amendments, the ADEA contained a broad
exemption for employer or union actions taken pursuant to a bona fide
seniority system or employee benefit plan.2 8 In United Airlines, Inc. v.
McMann, 29 the United States Supreme Court, rejecting the plaintiff's
proposal for a per se rule that would have required employers to show a
business or economic purpose to justify forced early retirement of an
employee, interpreted this exemption to allow the involuntary retirement
of protected individuals under the terms of a plan that antedated the
ADEA. Since it dealt with a pre-existing plan, however, the McMann case
did not settle the legality of an employer's election to force the early
retirement of a protected employee under a plan that granted such an
option. Thus, a split developed in the lower courts over whether an
employer "observed the terms" of a plan when it took such steps. One
group of courts held that the permissive nature of the provision was
irrelevant,30 but a second group, unwilling to give employers a free hand in
the matter, ruled that an employee had the opportunity to show that an
otherwise permissible plan was being administered discriminatorily.3 This
issue was largely mooted by the 1978 amendments, and the Act now
provides that the exemption for bona fide seniority systems and employee
benefit plans does not allow an employer to force the early retirement of a
protected worker.32
Nothing in the 1978 amendments deals with an employer's right to
deny pension benefits for workers over sixty-five, the normal retirement
age under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act,33 but the
Assistant Secretary of Labor has advised the Senate Committee on
Human Resources that an employer would not violate the ADEA by
failing to make pension contributions or their equivalent for an employee
27. But see Issarescu v. Cleland, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 346,349 (D.R.I. 1979) ("The fact that
Congress has now changed its mind and abolished the mandatory retirement provision [for federal
employees] does not affect the rationality and constitutionality of the previous legislative decision.").
28. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1976), amended by Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 2(a), 92 Stat. 189 (1978)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (Supp. 1979)).
29. 434 U.S. 192 (1977).
30. See, e.g., Marshall v. Baltimore & 0. R.R. Co., 461 F. Supp. 362 (D. Md. 1978); Marshallv.
Atlantic Container Line, 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1167 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
31. See, e.g., Cowlishaw v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 450 F. Supp. 148 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Hannan
v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 443 F. Supp. 802 (E.D. Mich. 1978). In both cases the courts recognized that
involuntary early retirement can be a proper tool of pension planning when used to weed out workers
whose productivity had declined prematurely, but both courts were concerned that this tool could also
be used merely to reduce payrolls when business turned sour.
32. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (Supp. 1979) (added by Pub. L. No.95-256, § 2(a),92 Stat. 189(1978)).
According to the new Wage and Hour Interpretive Bulletin, 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(c) (1979), "observes
the terms of a plan" means doing only what the plan requires, not what it permits.
33. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(24) (Supp. 1979).
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between the ages of sixty-five and seventy.34 In addition, the Department
of Labor, with the concurrence of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission,35 has announced new interpretive guidelines for employee
benefit plans, which allow an employer to provide reduced benefits to older
employees if the reduction can be justified on the basis of actual cost or
reasonable actuarial data.36 The actuarial data may be computed with
respect to an entire benefit package or on a benefit-by-benefit basis,37 and
either an age range of sixty-five to sixty-nine or five single-year ranges may
be used.38 An employer cannot, however, require greater contributions by
older employees as a condition of employment or participation in the
plan.39 The new regulations also set out specific guidelines for life, health,
and long-term disability insurance, and retirement plans.4°
3. Application of the ADEA to State and Local Governments
The ADEA applies to state and local governments as well as private
employers.41 It should also be noted that the Age Discrimination Act of
1975 42-a completely separate piece of legislation-extends to state and
local governments by prohibiting age discrimination by recipients of
federal financial assistance, including revenue-sharing funds.
In Arritt v. GriselP3 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
application of the ADEA to state and local government workers does not
violate the United States Constitution. This holding should be contrasted
with National League of Cities v. Usery,4 in which the United States
Supreme Court struck down the extension of the Fair Labor Standards
Act to state and municipal employees on the ground that it violated the
tenth amendment. The difference in results is supported by the Fourth
Circuit's conclusion that the ADEA was enacted to enforce section 5 of the
fourteenth amendment, rather than the commerce clause, and that the
Act's intrusion into the integral operation of state and local governments is
therefore justified.45 This result clearly seems correct in light of Fitzpatrick
v. Bitzer,46 which upheld the application of Title VII to state government
employees against an eleventh amendment challenge.
34. 8 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 421:360.
35. 44 Fed. Reg. 30,648 (1979).
36. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(a)-(d) (1979).
37. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(d)(2) (1979).
38. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(d)(3) (1979).
39. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(d)(4) (1979).
40. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(e), (f) (1979).
41. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1976).
42. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6107 (1976 & Supp. 1979).
43. 567 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1977). The same rationale was used inMarshallv. DelawareRiver&
Bay Authority, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1229 (D. Del. 1979), to apply the ADEA to an interstate
authority.
44. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
45. 567 F.2d at 1269-71.
46. 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (decided the same term as, but subsequent to, Usery). See also Note, The
Constitutionaity of the ADEA After Usery, 30 ARK. L. REV. 363 (1976).
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4. Administration of the Act
Prior to July 1, 1979, the ADEA was administered by the Wage and
Hour Division of the Department of Labor. In 1978 Reorganization Plan
No. 1, section 2, the President transferred the responsibility for admin-
istration and enforcement of the Act from the Secretary of Labor to the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, effective July 1, 1979.
47
II. TIME LIMITS AND OTHER PROCEDURAL PREREQUISITES
The ADEA expressly grants older workers the right to bring a private
suit but requires that they first satisfy certain procedural requirements
designed to give state and federal agencies an opportunity to resolve the
dispute through conciliation. 4' The procedures vary, depending upon
whether the potential plaintiff's state has an age discrimination law that
allows a state agency to grant or seek relief for discriminatory practices. If
a state agency does not have such authority, the plaintiff must file a charge
of age discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days "after the alleged
unlawful practice occurred, 4 9 and then wait at least 60 days before filing a
lawsuit in order to give the Commission a chance to remedy the practice by
"informal methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion."5
0
The federal procedure is more complicated if a state agency has the
authority to pursue relief on the plaintiff's behalf. In that case, the plaintiff
must generally take his claim to the state agency before filing a charge with
the EEOC. 1 The plaintiff must then file a charge with the federal agency
within 30 days after he is notified that the state proceedings have ended,52
but in no case later than 300 days after the alleged discriminatory practice
occurred. 3 The plaintiff must again wait to give the state and federal
agencies a chance to settle the dispute before commencing a private suit:
sixty days after filing the federal charge 4 and up to sixty days after filing
the state charge, unless the state proceedings end sooner.5 5 These
requirements have had a major impact on litigation under the Act; twenty-
one percent of all reported cases have been lost because the employee failed
to abide by the procedural prerequisites or time limits.
6
A. Filing the Federal Charge
1. Content of the Communication
As originally written, the Act required the employee to file a notice
47. 43 Fed. Reg. 19,807 (1978).
48. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)-(e) (1976 & Supp. 1979).
49. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1) (Supp. 1979).
50. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1976 & Supp. 1979).
51. 29 U.S.C. § 633(b) (1976).
52. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(2) (1976 & Supp. 1979).
53. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1976 & Supp. 1979).
54. Id.
55. 29 U.S.C. § 633(b) (1976).
56. Reed, The First Ten Years of the ADEA, 4 OHIo N.L. REv. 748, 759 (1977).
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with the Secretary of Labor, setting out his intention to bring a civil action
in federal district court within 180 days of the occurrence of the unlawful
practice." Under this provision, a number of courts held that papers which
simply complained of age discrimination did not constitute notice of intent
to file a lawsuit.5 8 The Fifth Circuit even went so far as to hold that a letter
to the Department of Labor complaining of discriminatory practices and
asking the Department to bring a suit was insufficient; the claimant had to
say explicitly that he intended to bring suit himself.59 On the other hand,
some courts held that providing the Secretary of Labor with information
about the claim was the functional equivalent of a notice of intent to sue.
60
Congress clearly intended to lay these problems to rest with the
passage of the 1978 amendments. For civil actions filed after April 6, 1978,
plaintiffs need no longer show that they filed a notice of intent to sue.
Instead, they are required to show only that they filed a charge alleging
discrimination. 6  However, one issue remains unsettled: the necessary
degree of specificity concerning the alleged unlawful conduct. At least one
court has imposed a strict standard, holding that the notice must set out
each allegedly unlawful act, and dismissing a private suit challenging
discriminatory conditions of employment and a retaliatory discharge
when the employee's notice had mentioned only a discriminatory
discharge.62
2. Form of the Communication
Both the original and amended versions of the ADEA specify that the
employee's communication must be "filed" with the responsible federal
agency. 63 The courts have split on whether the term "filed" requires a
written communication, or whether a telephone call will suffice.6 4 The
Conference Committee Report that accompanied the 1978 amendments
57. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1976), amended by Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 4(b), 92 Stat. 190 (1978)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (Supp. 1979)).
58. Charlier v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 556 F.2d 761 (5th Cir. 1977); Hiscottv. General Elec.
Co., 521 F.2d 632 (6th" Cir. 1975); Davis v. RJR Foods, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 930 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 556
F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1976).
59. Powell v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 494 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1974). See also Tanner v. GCC
Beverages, Inc., 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 489 (N.D. Fla. 1978) (letter stating that plaintiffhad filed suit
held to be insufficient).
60. Cowlishaw v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 425 F. Supp. 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); Smith v. Joseph
Schlitz Brewing Co., 419 F. Supp. 770 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'don other grounds, 584 F.2d 1231 (3d Cir.
1978); Sutherland v. SKF Industries, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 610 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
61. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (Supp. 1979) (added by Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 4(b), 92 Stat. 190 (1978)).
There is no substitute for filing a charge; it is ajurisdictional prerequisite. Bengochea v. Norcross, Inc.,
464 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
62. Looney v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 428 F. Supp. 533 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
63. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1976 & Supp. 1979).
64. Compare Reich v. Dow Badische Co., 575 F.2d 363 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006
(1978); Hays v. Republic Steel Corp., 531 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976); Enos v. Kaiser Indus. Corp., 443 F.
Supp. 798 (D.D.C. 1978); and Hughes v. Beaunit Corp., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1564 (E.D. Tenn.
1976) (all holding that oral notice is insufficient), with Noto v. JFD Elec. Corp., 446 F. Supp. 92
(E.D.N.C. 1978); and Woodford v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 369 F. Supp. 911 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (both
holding that oral notice is acceptable).
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noted, however, that the charge must be in writing,65 and this comment is
likely to carry a great deal of weight in future cases.
3. Is the Filing Period Jurisdictional?
Prior to the 1978 amendments, it was unclear whether the 180-day
filing period was or was not jurisdictional, with the courts taking one of
three positions on the question. One group of courts seemed to hold that
filing within the time limit was a jurisdictional prerequisite to the
commencement of an action.66 A second group agreed that the time limit
was jurisdictional, but indicated that in extreme situations a suit might be
permitted even though a claim was not filed within the 180-day period.67 A
third group of courts, led by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, held that
the filing period was akin to a statute of limitations, which could be tolled
under some circumstances. 68 The Supreme Court granted certiorari69 in
Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 70 a Tenth Circuit case decided along the lines of the
last position, but the lower court's decision was affirmed by an equally
divided Court,7 ' leaving no clear answer to the question.
The cases that allow tolling of the time period seem to be the better
reasoned. In Burnett v. New York Central Railroad2 the Supreme Court
rejected a mechanical approach for determining whether a time limit is
subject to equitable modification, opting instead for a search for
congressional intent. Although there is little to be gained from the
legislative history of the ADEA, cases that follow a strict jurisdictional
position seem to construe the purpose of the 180-day time limit too
restrictively. These cases73 correctly identify the purposes that the time
limit is designed to serve-namely, providing the agency an opportunity to
settle the dispute administratively while the complaint is still fresh, and the
employer a chance to collect the necessary papers and other evidence a -
but fail to recognize that an unbending interpretation of the time period is
65. [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1006.
66. Hiscott v. General Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1975); Law v. United Airlines Co., 519
F.2d 170 (10th Cir. 1975); Vaughn v. Chrysler Corp., 382 F. Supp. 143 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Oshiro v.
Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 80 (D. Haw. 1974); Gebhard v. GAF Corp., 59 F.R.D. 504
(D.D.C. 1973); Burgett v. Cudhay Co., 361 F. Supp. 617 (D. Kan. 1973).
67. Reich v. Dow Badische Co., 575 F.2d 363 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 (1978); Hays
v. Republic Steel Corp., 531 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976); Hughes v. Beaunit Corp., 12 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 1564 (E.D. Tenn. 1976); Enos v. Kaiser Indus. Corp., 443 F. Supp. 798 (D.D.C. 1978). To the
contrary, holding oral notice to be acceptable are: Noto v.JFD Elec. Corp.,446 F. Supp. 92 (E.D.N.C.
1978); Woodford v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 369 F. Supp. 911 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
68. See Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976), affid by an equally divided court,
434 U.S. 99 (1977). See also Bonham v. Dresser Indus., 569 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1977); Skoglund v. Singer
Co., 403 F. Supp. 797 (D.N.H. 1975); Bishop v. JelleffAssoc., 398 F. Supp. 579 (D.D.C. 1974).
69. 429 U.S. 1089 (1977).
70. 539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976), affd by an equally divided court, 434 U.S. 99 (1977).
71. 434 U.S. 99 (1977).
72. 380 U.S. 424 (1965).
73. See note 66 supra.
74. Id.
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not necessary to these goals. The cases75 that permit tolling, by
comparison, acknowledge that the purposes of the filing period limitation
can be accomplished even though the charge is filed more than 180 days
afterwards, as long as the evidence is still fresh.
The Conference Committee Report accompanying the 1978
amendments took the position that the 180-day period is not jurisdic-
tional.76 Since the 1978 amendments changed the basic structure of the
complaint process, substituting the filing of a "charge" for the "notice of
intent to sue, 77 and since this change was a compromise by those who
favored total elimination of the time limit,78 the Conference Committee's
comments should be given a great deal of deference by the courts.
The early cases that permit tolling are still useful in determining when
the 180-day period should be tolled.79 The factors to be considered, as
outlined in Abbott v. Moore Business Forms, Inc.,8 ° include (1) whether
the employee had actual or constructive notice of the procedural
requirements, (2) the employee's diligence once the remedies were made
known to him, (3) whether the employer has been prejudiced by the delay,
and (4) whether there were any misleading communications from the
federal agency. Some courts have also held that the filing period is tolled
when the employer fails to comply with the statutory requirement that
notices outlining employee rights be posted at the place of business.8
Compliance with the notice posting requirement, however, will not
necessarily protect the employer; the notice must also refer to the 180-day
period.82
4. Beginning and End of the Period
There is some question concerning when the 180-day period begins to
run in discharge cases. The majority of reported cases hold that the period
begins on the last day that the employee performed services for the
employer, even though he may have received compensation or other
benefits after that date.8 3 The three reasons most frequently given to
75. See note 68 supra.
76. [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 534.
77. Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 4(b), 92 Stat. 190 (1978).
78. 46 U.S.L.W. 56 (May 9, 1978).
79. See notes 66-68 supra.
80. 439 F. Supp. 643 (D.N.H. 1973).
81. Charlier v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 556 F.2d 761 (5th Cir. 1977); Bishop v. JelleffAssoc.,
398 F. Supp. 579 (D.D.C. 1974). Posting of notices outlining employees' rights is required by29 U.S.C.
§ 627 (1976).
The statute of limitations will not be tolled for an employee who is responsible for posting the
notice. Adams v. Federal Signal Corp., 559 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1977); Malinowski v. State Farm Insur.
Co., 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 693 (W.D. Pa. 1978).
82. Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976), af/'d by an equally divided court, 434
U.S. 99 (1977).
83. Bonham v. Dresser Indus., 569 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1977); Parrish v. Schlumberger Ltd., 19
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 717 (S.D. Tex. 1979); Jackson v. Alcan Sheet & Plate Co., 462 F. Supp. 82
(N.D.N.Y. 1978);Thomasv. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 449 F. Supp. 1021 (M.D.N.C. 1978); Notov. JFD
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support the date-of-discharge test are that it is the date on which the
employee has reason to know that he is the victim of discrimination, that it
assures that the federal enforcement agency will be able to investigate the
charge while it is still fresh, and that it avoids penalizing employers who
have liberal benefit plans that may extend over an extended period of
time.84 Some cases, however, hold that the period does not begin to run
until the date of administrative termination, the postponed termination
date elected for purposes of a pension benefit plan, or the date on which the
last payment of severance pay is received.85 The uncertainty created by
these decisions is mitigated somewhat by Anisgard v. Exxon Corp.,
86
which holds that a notice or charge is valid even though it is filed before the
effective date of the employee's discharge. Employees can therefore protect
themselves by filing when they are discharged.
The courts are also divided on whether a continuing practice of
discrimination-for example, a discharge followed by a refusal to rehire or
a demotion followed by a failure to promote-tolls the 180-day filing
period with respect to the first discriminatory act.87
5. Applicability of the Charge and Time
Limit Provisions
The filing requirements of the ADEA can be a key provision in
determining who can be joined in a lawsuit. An aggrieved employee who
fails to file an administrative charge within the time limits specified by the
Act may not be permitted to join in an action against the discriminating
employer. Similarly, a potential defendant who is not named in the charge
might not be subject to suit.
In Quinn v. Bowmar Publishing Co.88 the court held that an employee
could not sue individual corporate officers when he had named only the
corporate employer as the prospective defendant. On the other hand, in
Geller v. Markham89 the court applied a more flexible rule and allowed the
employee to sue four school officials not specifically named in the notice.
Applying a two-part test, the court ruled that dismissal was not required
since the purpose of the notice requirement had been fulfilled: first, the
notice had described the facts with sufficient clarity to lead the Department
Electronics Corp., 446 F. Supp. 92(E.D.N.C. 1978);Johnstonv. Aerojet General Corp., 18 FairEmpl.
Prac. Cas. 1107 (E.D. Cal. 1978); Aronsen v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1107
(E.D. Cal. 1978); Davis v. RJR Foods, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 930 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
84. See generally cases cited in note 83 supra.
85. Moses v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 525 F.2d 92 (8th Cir. 1975); Marshall v. Kimberly-Clark
Corp., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 690 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 12 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 1225 (D.N.M. 1975).
86. 409 F. Supp. 212 (E.D. La. 1975).
87. Compare Thomas v. DuPont Co., 574 F.2d 1324 (5th Cir. 1978); Mistretta v. Sandia Corp.,
15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 690 (D.N.M. 1977); Stanley v. General Motors Co., 71 F.R.D. 99 (S.D. Wis.
1976); McGinley v. Burroughs Corp., 407 F. Supp. 903 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
88. 445 F. Supp. 780 (D. Md. 1978).
89. 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1619 (D. Conn. 1979).
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of Labor to the four officials and the Department's investigation,
therefore, had not been hampered;90 second, the defendants had not been
prejudiced by the employee's failure to name them in the notice since they
had been represented by the school board's attorney and had virtually
identical interests in the litigation.91
As for joining other plaintiffs, it is now well established that a class
action under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is not
permitted under the ADEA.92 Employees may join in an action, however,
by filing a statement of consent in the court in which the action is
pending.93 The cases are split on whether each plaintiff must have filed a
notice, or whether it is enough that the original plaintiff had done so. 94
B. The Sixty Day Waiting Period
The charge must be filed not less than sixty days prior to commencing
a suit in federal district court.95 It is generally agreed that the sixty-day
waiting period is jurisdictional, and the case must be dismissed if the
complaint is filed less than sixty days after the charge was submitted.96
Because of the delays attendant in federal litigation, a dismissal can be
dangerous to the employee-plaintiff. Although a dismissal is without
prejudice,97 it might come after the statute of limitations had run, meaning
that a new suit would be time-barred.
Two reported cases have permitted an employee to bring suit even
though the sixty-day period had not yet elapsed at the time the suit was
commenced. In one case98 the court held that an employee need not wait
sixty days before filing suit when the Secretary of Labor informs him that it
will not be possible to resolve his charge administratively. The other case99
was based upon a peculiar set of circumstances. The employee first filed a
90. Id. at 1621.
91. Id. at 1621-22.
92. LaChapelle v. Owens-Illinois, 513 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1975).
93. 29 U.S.C. § 216 (1976).
94. Holding that notice is not required: Geller v. Markham, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1622 (D.
Conn. 1979); Catlett v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 358 (W.D. Mo. 1978); Cavanaugh v. Texas
Instruments, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 1124 (S.D. Tex. 1977); Locascio v. Teletype Corp., 74 F.R.D. 108
(N.D. Ill. 1977); Pandis v. Sikorsky Aircraft Division, 431 F. Supp. 793 (D. Conn. 1977) (limits class
only to those who could have filed timely notice to sue on that date the original plaintiffsent his notice);
Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1225 (D.N.M. 1975); Burgett v. Cudahy Co., 361
F. Supp. 617 (D. Kan. 1973). Cases to the contrary, holding that notice must have been given by each
class member, are: Travers v. Corning Glass Works, 76 F.R.D. 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); McCorstin v.
United States Steel Corp., II Fair EmpI. Prac. Cas. 1478 (N.D. Ala. 1974); Oshiro v. Pan Am. World
Airways, 378 F. Supp. 80 (D. Haw. 1974); Price v. Maryland Cas. Co., 62 F.R.D. 614 (S.D. Miss.
1972).
95. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1976 & Supp. 1979).
96. Rucker v. Great Scott Super Markets, 528 F.2d 393 (6th Cir. 1976); Hiscottv. General Elec.
Co., 521 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1975); Hannonv. Continental Nat'l Bank, 427 F. Supp. 215 (D. Colo. 1977).
97. See, e.g., Miller v. Saxbe, 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 468 (D.D.C. 1975) (Title VII case).
98. Nickel v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 424 F. Supp. 884 (E.D. Mich. 1976), aff'd, 599 F.2d 1055
(6th Cir. 1979).
99. Seider v. Canada Dry Corp., 18 Fair EmpI. Prac. Cas. 1787 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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charge against the employer, a corporate subsidiary, then, fifty-two days
later, followed it with a second charge against the parent company.
100
Fifty-seven days later, he filed a private action against both companies."'
The court refused to dismiss the complaint against the parent, finding that
the Secretary of Labor had been given ample time to pursue conciliatory
remedies, and that the plaintiff could have skirted the time limit in any
event by amending his complaint four days after it was filed.102 Since the
purpose of the sixty-day time limit is to give the agency a chance to resolve
the charge, the result in both cases seems correct.10 3
C. State Remedies
A state which has its own law prohibiting age discrimination and an
agency empowered to grant or seek relief for discriminatory practices is
commonly referred to as a deferral state since the time for filing a charge
with the EEOC is extended. Under current practice, the charge must be
filed within 300 days after the occurence of the allegedly discriminatory act
or within 30 days of the receipt of a notice that the state proceedings have
ended, whichever is earlier.10 4 In addition, no private lawsuit can be
commenced within sixty days after the charge is filed with the state agency,
unless the state proceedings end sooner.0 5
The greatest dispute in this area, only recently resolved by the
Supreme Court, was whether a plaintiff must first resort to state remedies
before filing a complaint in federal court. Some lower courts had held that
resort to the state agency (when available) was ajurisdictional prerequisite
to suit in the federal courts;10 6 but others, although referring to the
requirement as jurisdictional, excused the plaintiff's failure to seek state
relief.10 7 Moreover, in Holliday v. Ketchum, MacLeod & Grove, Inc.,l" s
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, relying on a comment in the Senate
100. Id. at 1788.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1788-89.
103. Note, Procedural Prerequisites to Private Suit Under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 44 U. CHi. L. REv. 457, 463 (1977).
104. 28 U.S.C. § 626(d)(2) (Supp. 1979).
105. 28 U.S.C. § 633(b) (1976).
106. Curry v. Continental Airlines, 513 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1975); Hadfield v. Mitre Corp.,459 F.
Supp. 829 (D. Mass. 1978) (following Love v. Pullman, 404 U.S. 522 (1972)); Enos v. Kaiser Indus.
Corp., 443 F. Supp. 798 (D.D.C. 1978) (collecting cases); Bertsch v. Ford MotorCo.,415 F. Supp. 619
(E.D. Mich. 1976); Graham v. Chrysler Corp., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 876 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Berry
v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 673 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Anisgard v. Exxon Corp.,409 F.
Supp. 212 (E.D. La. 1975); Raynor v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 400 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Va. 1975);
Garces v. Sagner Int'l, Inc., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 569 (D.P.R. 1974).
107. Reich v. Dow Badische Co., 575 F.2d 363 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 (1978);
Taylor v. Sierra Club, 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1349 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Arnold v. HawaiianTel. Co., 12
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 400 (D. Haw. 1975).
108. 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1075 (W.D. Pa. 1977). See also Gabriele v. Chrysler Corp., 573
F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1978); Evans v. Oscar Mayer & Co., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1119 (8th Cir. 1978),
rev'd on other grounds, 441 U.S. 750 (1979); Cubbedgev. National Geographic Soe'y,449 F. Supp. 553
(D.D.C. 1978); Bertrand v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 419 F. Supp. 1123 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
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Human Resources Committee's 1978 report that states that employees
could elect whether to seek state relief, held that the resort to state relief is
entirely optional and in no way affects the right to bring a private action in
federal court.
The reasons given for requiring recourse to an available state remedy
were much the same as those given to support the decisions that held that
the federal filing requirement is jurisdictional. 10 9 On the other hand, at
least three arguments were made in support of the opposite result. It has
been pointed out that the prior recourse requirement is meaningless since
the statute clearly allows an action to be commenced in federal court prior
to the completion of the state proceedings. 10 Others have pointed out that
the addition of a further jurisdictional prerequisite only serves to frustrate
the remedial purpose of the Act and impede its enforcement. Finally, some
authorities have noted that the decisions requiring resort to state
proceedings under Title VII, for example, Love v. Pullman Co.,' are not
applicable to the ADEA since state and federal investigations can proceed
at the same time under the ADEA but not Title VII.
112
Fortunately, many of the problems caused by the prior recourse
question were resolved in the Supreme Court's decision in Oscar Mayer &
Co. v. Evans.113 The case answered two important questions. First, the
Court held that an employee must resort to the administrative remedies
provided by a deferral state before initiating a suit in federal court under
the Act. 1 4 In reaching this result the Court observed that the language
found in the ADEA is nearly identical to the comparable provision of Title
VII. 115 On this basis, it concluded that Congress must have intended the
construction of the Act to follow that of Title VII." 6 The Court then
turned to a second, lesser procedural question, holding that state time
limits governing the filing of a charge of age discrimination do not affect
whether an employee may bring an action in federal court." 7 The Court
noted that section 14(b) of the Act" 8 merely requires that a potential
109. See Note, Procedural Prerequisites to Private Suit Under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 44 U. CHi. L. REv. 457, 475-79 (1977) (summarizing both sides of the argument).
110. Section 633(b) provides only that "no suit may be brought ...before the expiration of
sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the state law (emphasis added)."
111. 404 U.S. 522 (1972).
112. The arguments for and against making state proceedings jurisdictional are summarized in
Note, Procedural Prerequisites to Private Suit Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 44
U. Cm. L. REv. 457, 475-79 (1977).
113. 441 U.S. 750 (1979). The Third Circuit has recently ruled that Evans does not require the
federal enforcement agency to resort to state proceedings before filing a suit since the agency's powerto
sue is derived from the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976 & Supp. 1979), which
does not require resort to state proceedings. Marshall v. Chamberlain Mfg. Co., 601 F.2d 100 (3d Cir.
1979).
114. Id. at 758.
115. Id. at 756.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 758-65.
118. 28 U.S.C. § 633(b) (1976).
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plaintiff "commence" a state proceeding more than sixty days before filing
suit, 9 and proceedings are commenced when the employee sends a
"written and signed statement of the facts" on which the charge is based to
the state agency by registered mail. 20 The Court rejected the employer's
argument that the employee's failure to file within the state's 120-day
statute of limitations barred the action in federal court,12' and ordered that
the action be held in abeyance pending plaintiffs compliance with the
necessary state prerequisites.1
2
Of course, the deferral section of the Act still presents traps for the
unwary practitioner. One question that arises from time-to-time is whether
a particular state's laws give a state agency the power to grant or seek relief,
the triggering event under section 14(b).12 ' The courts have held that the
laws of Illinois, Ohio, and North Carolina do not meet the requirements of
section 14(b),12 4 while the laws of Kentucky do. 2 5 The inherent danger is
that an employee will in good faith believe that there is a state remedy
which qualifies under section 14(b) and, accordingly, will place his reliance
on the 300-day filing limitation that applies when a deferral state is in the
picture rather than the 180-day limitation that governs nondeferral
situations. 1 6 If the employee later turns out to be wrong in his judgment,
the federal limitations period may have expired. It is important to note,
however, that an employee can effectively give notice to the federal
enforcement agency before commencing state proceedings,127 and an
employee should take no chances, filing within the 180-day limit even if
there is a clear state remedy available.
D. Statute of Limitations
The ADEA, through section 7(e), 28 incorporates the statute of
limitations found in the Portal-to-Portal Act. 129 The period is three years
for willful violations of the Act and two years for other violations.130 Thus
far, the courts are in agreement that the burden is on the employer to prove
the facts necessary to reduce the period from three years to two.
1 31
119. 441 U.S. at 759.
120. Id. at 760.
121. Id. at 758-59.
122. Id. at 764-65.
123. 29 U.S.C. § 633(b) (1976).
124. Eklund v. Lubrizol Corp., 529 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1975); Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 19
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 170 (W.D.N.C. 1979); Bertrand v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 419 F. Supp. 1123,
on recon., 432 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Ill. 1976). Ohio has recently given its Civil Rights Commission the
power (effective November 13, 1979) to grant relief for age discrimination violations. OHio REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 4112.01-.99 (Page 1973 Supp. 1980). Accordingly, it should now qualify as a deferral state.
125. Prater v. Shell Oil Co., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1114 (W.D. Ky. 1977).
126. See, e.g., Paxton v. Lanvin-Charles of the Ritz, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
127. Id.; Magalotti v. Ford Motor Co., 418 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
128. 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) (1976 & Supp. 1979).
129. 29 U.S.C. § 255 (1976).
130. 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) (1976 & Supp. 1979).
131. Marshall v. Hill Bros.,432 F. Supp. 1320 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Plattv. Burroughs Corp.,424 F.
Supp. 1329 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
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Here, too, practitioners face the problem of determining when the
period begins and when it ends. The cases agree that the statute does not
begin to run until the employee has reason to know that he has been
injured. In discharge cases the statute generally begins to run on the date
that the employee is discharged-that is, when he stops performing
services for the employer. 132 By comparison, when the employee is
challenging the provisions of a seniority system, the statute does not begin
to run until the provisions are actually applied to him.
33
The leading case on tolling the statute of limitations is Ott v. Midland-
Ross Corp. (Ott II).134 The issue in that case was whether Ott, who had filed
his suit three years and seven months after he was discharged, had waited
too long to file suit after learning of the company's fraudulent efforts to
dissuade him from suing at all.135 The lower court entered summary
judgment in favor of the employer, 36 but the court of appeals reversed,
holding that, on a motion for summary judgment, the question was not
whether the employee "knew or should have known" of the employer's
impending action, but whether he "would inevitably have been led . . . to
the conclusion" that the employer intended to terminate his contract.
37
The 1978 amendments added a provision for tolling the limitations
period for up to one year while the federal enforcement agency attempts to
secure the employer's voluntary compliance. 138 This provision should
reduce the advantage that an employer can gain by dragging its heels
during the conciliation process, a tactic which has presented problems in
the past.
E. The Duty to Seek Conciliation Before Bringing Suit
The federal agency responsible for enforcing the Act, now the EEOC,
may bring an action in its own name, but it must first attempt to gain
voluntary compliance through informal methods. 39 Employers have had
some success in using this requirement to thwart enforcement suits
brought by the EEOC.
40
The statute says that the agency "shall attempt to effect
voluntary compliance,"' 4 ' but the question is how much effort the agency
must put into its attempt. In an early decision construing this provision,
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, relying on the 1967 House Report,
concluded that "the [agency] must initially use exhaustive, affirmative
132. Jackson v. Alcan Sheet & Plate, 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 113 (N.D.N.Y. 1978).
133. Morelock v. NCR Corp., 586 F.2d 1096 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 906 (1979).
134. 600 F.2d 24 (6th Cir. 1979).
135. Id. at 26-27.
136. Id. at 27.
137. Id. at 28.
138. Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 4(c), 92 Stat. 191 (1978) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 626(e)(2) (Supp.
1979)).
139. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976).
140. See cases cited in notes 141-59 infra.
141. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976).
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action to attempt to achieve conciliation."' 142 More recently, however, a
district court rejected the word "exhaustive," noting that it did not appear
in the statute.1 43 The district court pointed out that the word was absent for
a very good reason: the more pervasive the violation, the more difficult it
would be for the agency to secure compliance, and the Act only required
that the agency's efforts be "reasonably thorough under all the cir-
cumstances." 14
The disagreement over the adjective used to describe the proper
agency efforts has made little difference in practice; the courts seem to
agree on the specific types of conduct that satisfy the agency's obligation.
The agency must, at the outset of negotiations, inform the employer that it
suspects a violation of the ADEA and tell the employer what must be done
to comply with the Act.1 45 The agency must also explain to the employer
that back wages may be recovered by injured employees, that the violation
may cause the agency to bring suit in federal district court, and that the
employer will be given a chance to respond to the allegations before a suit is
filed.
146
Numerous cases reflect the failure of either the Department of Labor
or the EEOC to satisfy this obligation. The failure to provide an
opportunity for employer response has been the leading cause of judicial
dissatisfaction with agency conciliation efforts. On other occasions, the
agency either has refused to engage in negotiations unless the employer
waived the statute of limitations 47 or has made only a cursory effort at
conciliation, for example, two meetings and a telephone call or four short
meetings over the course of two years. 148 In still other cases, the agency has
limited the scope of its efforts to violations that occurred during a specified
period of time or to discriminatory acts that affected only a limited number
of employees, then filed a lawsuit challenging a broader range of prac-
tices. 149
But in Marshall v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 50 the most thorough
discussion of agency responsibilities to date, the court upheld the agency's
actions. In Marshall the Department of Labor had provided the em-
142. Brennan v. Ace Hardware Corp., 495 F.2d 368,374 (8th Cir. 1974), citing[1967] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2213, 2218.
143. Marshall v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 78 F.R.D. 97 (D. Conn. 1978).
144. Id. at 104.
145. Usery v. Sun OilCo.,605 F.2d 1331 (5th Cir. 1979), sets outthe standards for agency action.
146. Id.
147. Marshall v. Sun Oil Co., 592 F.2d 563 (10th Cir.) cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 49 (1979); Marshall
v. Newburg R-2 School Dist., 469 F. Supp. 1030 (E.D. Mo. 1979).
148. Brennan v. Ace Hardward Corp., 495 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1974); Marshall v. Baltimore& O.
R.R. Co., 461 F. Supp. 362 (D. Md. 1978). But see Marshall v. American Motors Corp., 475 F. Supp.
875 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
149. Marshall v. Tecumseh Prods. Co., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1400 (W.D. Tenn. 1978); Usery
v. Sun Oil Co., 423 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Tex. 1976), rev'd sub. nom., Marshall v. Sun Oil Co., 21 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 257 (5th Cir. 1979).
150. 78 F.R.D. 97 (D. Conn. 1978).
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ployer with a full list of the employees allegedly affected by the employer's
discriminatory conduct and an estimate of the potential liability for back
pay with an explanation of how the figures had been computed. 15' The
Department also identified new victims during the course of seven-day
long negotiation sessions. 152 Hartford challenged the Department's efforts
on three grounds: first, that the Department had refused to compute the
exact amount of back pay due employees until Hartford had admitted lia-
bility; second, that the Department had failed to explain its reasoning for
inferring discrimination in each individual case; and, finally, that the
Department had not bargained to impasse on each charge. 153 The court
rejected each of these arguments. It first ruled that the Department's esti-
mates of back pay were sufficient for purposes of negotiation.1 54 It then
turned to Hartford's substantiation argument, holding that the Depart-
ment was not required to furnish evidence to support each individual
charge. 55 Finally, the court ruled that the statute did not require the De-
partment to discuss each charge with the employer; it was enough that the
Department stated the nature of the charge and provided the employer
with an opportunity to respond to it.'
56
The courts have generally agreed that conciliatory efforts are a
jurisdictional prerequisite to the maintenance of an action by a federal
agency, but they reach differing results on what to do with a lawsuit when
the agency fails to satisfy its obligation. At least two courts have granted
summary judgment in the employer's favor on issues that the agency failed
to discuss with the employer before filing suit. 5 7 The Eighth Circuit has
adopted the position that the trial judge has discretion to stay the action
pending further conciliation conferences or to dismiss the suit.158 In more
recent cases, the district courts have generally preferred to grant a stay, but
the Tenth Circuit has suggested that a stay is improper if the agency has not
made a substantial initial effort at informal agreement. 59
III. JURY TRIAL AND DAMAGES
A. Right to Trial by Jury
In Lorillard v. Pons 160 the Supreme Court resolved a split in authority
151. Id. at 100-01.
152. Id. at 101-02.
153. Id. at 104.
154. Id. at 105.
155. Id. at 105-06.
156. Id. at 106-07.
157. Marshall v. Tecumseh Prods. Co., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1400 (W.D. Tenn. 1978); Usery
v. Sun Oil Co., 423 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Tex. 1975).
158. Brennan v. Ace Hardware Corp., 495 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1974).
159. Marshall v. Sun Oil Co., 592 F.2d 563 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 49 (1979). See also
Marshall v. Newburg R-2 School Dist., 469 F. Supp. 1030 (E.D. Mo. 1979); Marshall v. Baltimore &
0. R.R. Co., 461 F. Supp. 362 (D. Md. 1978).
160. 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
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by holding, as a matter of statutory construction, that there is a right to
trial by jury under the ADEA. The 1978 amendments specifically provide
that either party may request a jury trial on all issues of fact.16 1
B. Damages
The damage provision of the ADEA is somewhat complicated.
Basically, the Act provides that
[a]mounts owing to a person as a result of a violation of this chapter shall be
deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation for
purposes of sections 216 and 217 of this title, Provided, That liquidated
damages shall be payable only in cases of willful violations of this chapter. In
any action brought to enforce this chapter the court shall have jurisdiction to
grant such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the
purposes of this chapter, including without limitation judgments compelling
employment, reinstatement or promotion, or enforcing the liability for
amounts deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime
compensation under this section.
162
In addition to equitable relief, this section appears to create three
categories of money damages: back pay ("amounts owing"), double or
"liquidated" damages for willful violations, and other legal relief "as may
be appropriate." Three questions concerning the propriety of granting the
latter two types of relief have troubled the courts. First, are damages for
the plaintiff's pain and suffering proper? Second, can punitive damages be
awarded? Finally, what constitutes a "willful" violation of the ADEA?
1. Pain and Suffering
The authorities are sharply divided over whether awards for pain and
suffering and similar intangible damages are available under the ADEA.
Four courts of appeals 63 have held that damages of this type cannot be
awarded, and there are any number of district court decisions1 64 on both
161. Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 4(a), 92 Stat. 190 (1978) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2) (Supp.
1979)).
162. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976).
163. Slatin v. Stanford Research Institute, 590 F.2d 1292 (4th Cir. 1979); Vasquez v. Eastern
Airlines, 579 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1978); Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978); Dean v. American Security Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978).
164. The eases permitting an award for pain and suffering include: Flynn v. Morgan Guar. Trust
Co., 463 F. Supp. 676 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Morton v. Sheboygan Memorial Hospital, 458 F. Supp. 804
(E.D. Wis. 1978); Gifford v. B.D. Diagnostics,458 F. Supp. 462 (N.D. Ohio 1978); Buchholzv. Symons
Mfg. Co., 445 F. Supp. 706 (E.D. Wis. 1978); Coates v. National Cash Register Co., 433 F. Supp. 655
(W.D. Va. 1977); Combes v. Griffin Television, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 841 (W.D. Okla. 1976); Bertrand v.
Orkin Exterminating Co., 419 F. Supp. 1123 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
Decisions in which district courts have refused to award pain and suffering include: Douglas v.
American Cyanamid Co., 472 F. Supp. 298 (D. Conn. 1979); Jaffee v. Plough Broadcasting Co., 19
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1194 (D. Md. 1979); Brin v. Bigsby and Kruthers, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 415
(N.D. Ill. 1979); Stevenson v. J.C. Penney Co., 464 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Riddlev. Getty Ref. &
Marketing Co., 460 F. Supp. 678 (N.D. Okla. 1978); Dunwoodie v. Chrysler Corp., 459 F. Supp. 971
(E.D. Mich. 1978); Ellis v. Phillippine Airlines, 443 F. Supp. 251 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Postemski v. Pratt
& Whitney Aircraft, 443 F. Supp. 101 (D. Conn. 1977); Jaeger v. American Cyanamid Co., 442 F.
Supp. 1270 (E.D. Wis. 1978); Catlett v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1664 (W.D. Mo.
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sides of the issue. Not infrequently, two judges within the same district will
disagree on this question.
The most persuasive reason for allowing recovery of damages for pain
and suffering is the language of the Act itself. It permits "legal . . . relief,
including without limitation . . . enforcing the liability for amounts
deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compen-
,,16Ssation. . . . If Congress did intend to limit recovery to back wages
only, its use of the words "without limitation" is unexplainable. Other
points that favor allowing plaintiffs to recover for pain and suffering
include (1) the legislative history of the Act, 66 (2) the fact that out-of-
pocket losses resulting from employment discrimination are often
negligible when compared to the psychological injuries caused by an
employer's illegal conduct,1 67 (3) the award of damages for pain and
suffering promotes enforcement of the statute by providing victims with an
incentive to seek redress, (4) the threat of substantial damages deters
employers from violating the Act, and (5) the awards contribute to public
understanding of the statute.
6 8
There are also several reasons for not awarding damages for pain and
suffering. First, any administrative relief is limited to an award of back
pay,1 69 and it would frustrate the conciliation process if employees knew
that they stood to recover a substantially larger amount by bringing suit.
Second, the volume of litigation would increase significantly if employees
1978); Seider v. Canada Dry Corp., 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1786 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Cavanaugh v.
Texas Instruments, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 1124 (S.D. Tex. 1977); Dorsey v. Consolidated Broadcasting
Corp., 432 F. Supp. 542 (E.D. Wis. 1977); Fellows v. Medford Corp., 431 F. Supp. 199 (D. Or. 1977);
Looney v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 428 F. Supp. 533 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Hannon v.
Continental Nat'l Bank, 427 F. Supp. 215 (D. Col. 1977); Platt v. Burroughs Corp., 424 F. Supp. 1329
(E.D. Pa. 1976).
The courts have also held that injury to reputation is not compensable under the ADEA. Schlicke
v. Allen-Bradley Co., 448 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Wis. 1978); Dorsey v. Consolidated Broadcasting Corp.,
432 F. Supp. 542 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
165. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976).
166. 113 CONG. REC. 34745 (1967) (comments of Rep. Eilburg). See also Note, Damage
Remedies Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 47,59 & n.47, 60
& n.51 (1976). Cf. Vasquez v. Eastern Airlines, 579 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1978) (indicating that Congress
saw age discrimination only as a problem of false assumptions, and that back pay is enough to correct
this problem).
167. See Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Corp., 404 F. Supp. 324 (D.N.J. 1975), rev'don
other grounds, 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978).
168. Note, Damage Remedies Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 43 BROOKrLYN
L. REV. 47,56 (1976). Experience with pain and suffering has been mixed. In Rogers v. Exxon Research
& Eng'r Corp., 404 F. Supp. 324 (D.N.J. 1975), the jury awarded $750,000.00 for pain and suffering,
which was reduced to $200,000.00 by the court. In Frith v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., No. C-C-76-242
(W.D.N.C. 1978), an employee who was demoted from supervisor to agent was given $50,000 by the
jury for mental anguish. The court in a non-jury case, Buchholz v. Symons Mfg. Co., 445 F. Supp. 706
(E.D. Wis. 1978), awarded S7,500 for mental suffering consisting of stress in the marital relationship,
pressure curtailing social acitivity and vacation plans, and loss of sleep. For some sources of evidence
which can be used in age discrimination cases to support adverse physical and physiological effects of
forced retirement, see the Senate Report accompanying the 1978 amendments. [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 506-07.
169. The ADEA limits recovery to amounts that are treated as "unpaid minimum wage" and
unpaid overtime compensation." 29 U.S.C. § 626 (1976). This phraseology indicates that the sole
remedy is back wages. See, e.g., Slatin v. Stanford Research Inst., 590 F.2d 1292 (4th Cir. 1979).
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were urged on by the prospect of large recoveries. Finally, the Conference
Committee Report accompanying the 1978 amendments suggested that
damages for pain and suffering could not be recovered under the Act.1 70
These arguments, however, hardly support a refusal to award pain and
suffering damages. The first two reasons are more the product of judicial
disillusionment with pain and suffering damages than an interpretation of
the Act.1 71 Moreover, both arguments are highly speculative, and it is
equally likely that employers, knowing that a court could not award more
than back pay, would refuse to settle disputes at the administrative level.
Nor is the opinion of the Conference Committee persuasive; because the
1978 amendments did not affect the portion of the Act that deals with
remedies, and because the problem of interpreting these provisions had
emerged long before the Committee report was drafted, the report adds
nothing to the legislative history of the Act.
1 72
2. Punitive Damages
The courts have also failed to reach a consensus on whether punitive
damages can be recovered under the Act.173 The chief reason for allowing
punitive damages is that they are generally recoverable in an action based
on a statute unless the statute specifically negates their availability. 174 The
ADEA provides a broad range of legal remedies, and it would seem that
punitive damages can be awarded.1
75
But the arguments against awarding punitive damages are more
persuasive. The principal objection is the express statutory provision for
liquidated damages, which may be recovered whenever the employer acted
willfully. 76 Since willfulness is also the basis for awarding punitive
damages, 77 a plaintiff could recover an excessive judgment if both
170. [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 535.
171. See Coates v. National Cash Register Co., 433 F. Supp. 655 (W.D. Va. 1977).
172. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 349 (1963).
173. Cases holding that punitive damages cannot be awarded include: Dean v. American
Security Assurance Co., 559 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978); Rogers v.
Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978);
Stevenson v. J.C. Penney Co., 469 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. 111. 1979); Quinn v. Bownar Publishing Co., 445
F. Supp. 780 (D. Md. 1978); Jaeger v. American Cyanamid Co., 442 F. Supp. 1270 (E.D. Wis. 1978);
Riddle v. Getty Ref. & Marketing Co., 460 F. Supp. 678 (N.D. Okla. 1978); Gifford v. B.D.
Diagnostics, 458 F. Supp. 462 (N.D. Ohio 1978); Hannonv. Continental Nat'l Bank,427 F. Supp. 215
(D. Colo. 1977). To the contrary are: Walker v. Pettit Constr. Co., 437 F. Supp. 730 (D.S.C. 1977);
Coates v. National Cash Register Co., 433 F. Supp. 655 (W.D. Va. 1977); Combes v. Griffin Television,
Inc., 421 F. Supp. 841 (W.D. Okla. 1976); Bertrand v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 419 F. Supp. 1123
(N.D. Ii. 1976).
174. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2 (4th ed. 1971).
175. One court finds comfort in the extensive discussion of the "legal remedies" provision in
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978), to support the conclusion that punitive damages are permitted.
Kennedy v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 449 F. Supp. 1008 (D. Colo. 1978). In support of the jury
trial claim in Lorillard, the respondent argued that punitive damages are recoverable, but the Supreme
Court declined to allude to this issue in its opinion. It is submitted that the Kennedy decision reads
more into Lorillard than is warranted.
176. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976).
177. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 9-10 (4th ed. 1971).
[Vol. 41:349
A GE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLO YMENT
liquidated and punitive damages are available. Congress apparently meant
the liquidated damages provision to serve as a substitute for punitive
damages. The legislative history suggests that liquidated damages were
incorporated into the Act to deter and punish violations, and the proposed
criminal penalties were deleted when the liquidated damage provision was
added.
78
3. Willfulness as the Basis
for Liquidated Damages
The ADEA provides that liquidated damages can be awarded for
willful violations. 179 Two standards have emerged for defining willfulness.
Roughly half the reported cases have defined the term to mean any
violation that is intentional, knowing, or voluntary, as opposed to
accidental. 8 To illustrate, an employer would be guilty of a willful
violation if he intended to discharge the employee, even if he did not mean
to violate the Act. Under this construction, virtually every violation would
be willful. Other courts have adopted a more stringent view, however,
requiring proof that the employer intended to take the action and that it
did so knowing that the decision was prohibited by the ADEA.' 8'
An important aspect of the ADEA is that the court has no discretion
to withdraw or reduce an award of liquidated damages once the trier of fact
has decided that the employer acted willfully. As the Supreme Court
pointed out in Lorillard v. Pons,182 the ADEA does not incorporate the
notion-contained in the Portal-to-Portal Act-that a court has
discretion to refuse liquidated damages when it is satisfied that the
employer acted in good faith.
IV. PROVING AGE DISCRIMINATION
Litigators preparing an age discrimination case for trial should heed
178. 113 CONG. REc. 2199, 7076 (1967) (comments of Sen. Javits). See also Note, Damage
Remedies Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 43 BROOKLYN L. REv. 47, 59 & n.47, 60
& n.51 (1976); Dean v. American Security Assurance Co., 559 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1066 (1978); Gifford v. B.D. Diagnostics, 458 F. Supp. 462 (N.D. Ohio 1978).
The Conference Committee Report written in connection with the 1978 amendments takes the
position that only lost wages and fringe benefits, together with the statutory liquidated damages, are
recoverable under the ADEA. The report specifically states that punitive damages cannot be recovered.
[ 1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1007. Because the provisions of the Act relating to remedies were
not affected by the 1978 amendments, and because the construction issue had emerged in the courts
prior to the drafting of this report, this document should not be regarded as a competent aid to
statutory construction. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 349 (1963).
179. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976).
180. Hays v. Republic Steel Corp., 531 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976); Rogers v. Exxon Research &
Eng'r Co., 404 F. Supp. 324 (D.N.J. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978); Hodgson v. Ideal Corrugated Box Co., 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. 805 (N.D.
W. Va. 1974).
181. Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003 (1 st Cir. 1979); Coates v. National Cash Register Co.,
433 F. Supp. 655 (W.D. Va. 1977); Bishop v. Jelleff Assoc., 398 F. Supp. 579 (D.D.C. 1974).
182. 434 U.S. 575,581 n.8 (1978). The First Circuit agrees. Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003
(I st Cir. 1979). But see Hays v. Republic Steel Corp., 531 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976), a case that has no
continued validity in light of the Supreme Court's Lorillard decision.
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this cardinal rule: keep the elements of the prima facie case distinct from
the ultimate facts to be proven at trial. The Supreme Court has recently
warned that the description of a prima facie case outlined in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green'83 cannot be given a "rigid, mechanized or
ritualistic" interpretation.18 4 Unfortunately, the prima facie test has
fossilized in the minds of many practitioners. Too often attorneys assume
that the McDonnell Douglas standard is the only test of age discrimina-
tion, or even worse, that it conclusively establishes a case of discrimina-
tion. Commentators, too, have turned to the elements of the prima facie
case too quickly, taking what must be proved as a given and limiting their
discussion to the means of proving it.185 By postponing our discussion of
the prima facie case, we hope to give a simpler explanation of the roles
played by the prima facie standard, shifting evidentiary burdens, statistics,
and defenses in age discrimination cases.
A. Allegations and Responses
1. What the Plaintiff Must Prove
To prevail at trial, the plaintiff-employee must ultimately prove three
facts by a preponderance of the evidence.'86 First, he must show that the
defendant made an employment decision that was unfavorable to him-
for example, that the defendant failed to hire or promote him, denied him a
raise, fired him, or refused to refer him for employment. Second, the
employee must prove that the plaintiff was within the age range protected
by the Act at the time the decision was made. Finally, the plaintiff must
show that the real reason for the defendant's actions was the plaintiff's age.
Our choice of the term "the real reason" requires some explanation.
First, use of the phrase avoids the clumsier term "discriminatory intent,"
which misleadingly raises the same questions that must be answered in
deciding whether the defendant's conduct was willful." 7 The ADEA does
not prohibit all discrimination because discrimination, technically, means
to distinguish for the purpose of making a choice,' which is not
necessarily unlawful. The Act prohibits discrimination only when the basis
of the distinction is the person's age. In this context, the term
"discriminatory intent" interjects false issues since it suggests that the
defendant either intended to make the choice (which, barring some
183. 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (race discrimination in hiring) (Title VII).
184. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
185. See, e.g., S. AGID, FAIR EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION: PROVING AND DEFENDING A TITLE VII
CASE 520 (2d ed. 1979); Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of1967,90 HARV. L. REV.
380, 388 (1976). In Note, Proving Discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
17 ARiz. L. REV. 495 (1975), the author does try to explain what the plaintiffultimately must prove, but
limits the discussion to whether the employee must show that the employer intended to violate the law.
186. See generally, Note, Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,90 HARV. L. REV.
380, 388-99 (1976).
187. See text accompanying notes 180-81 supra.
188. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 648 (1966).
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mistake, is always true) or consciously based its choice on the plaintiff's
age. The first implication is technically correct, but useless in practice since
choices may be unintentional. For example, suppose an employer has
failed to hire an applicant because it has lost his application. What
difference does it make whether the employer's explanation is that it did
not intentionally refuse to hire the applicant, because it did not know he
had applied, or whether the explanation is that it did not hire him because
his application was lost? An unintentional distinction, in this sense, is
never one made on the basis of age. On the other hand, the second
inference is not entirely accurate since the ADEA is designed to eradicate
both conscious and unconscious stereotypes about the abilities of older
workers. 8 9 The proscriptions of the Act are not limited to employers who
know that age is the reason why they are treating older workers
unfavorably. 90
Our second reason for choosing the term "the real reason" is that it
describes the proper standard for determining liability when the defendant
has multiple reasons for making a choice. Recognizing that an
employment decision may be based on a number of factors, courts have
developed tests to evaluate whether the defendant's reliance on the
plaintiff's age was sufficient to warrant a violation of the Act. Although
similar in substance, these tests can be confusing. The most stringent
requirement, from the plaintiff's point of view, is that age must be the sole
motivating factor.'9 The middle position is that age must be a factor that
"made a difference,"' 192 while the most generous position requires only that
age be "one factor in the decision," or the reason for the decision "in whole
or in part."' 93
Both the generous and the stringent positions have faults. Under the
generous standard the trier of fact may be forced to discredit undisputed
evidence of age bias if it believes that other factors were more important.
For example, in Kentroti v. Frontier Airlines194 the trial court heard
189. Note, The Cost of Growing Old: Business Necessity and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 88 YALE L. J. 565, 578-79 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, Business Necessity and
the A DEA].
190. If the word "unconscious" troubles the reader, then "well-intended" may be more
satisfactory. Regardless of the description, the Act is meant to prevent an employer from assuming
that, for example, older workers are less productive than younger ones, whether or not the employer is
"conscious" that this assumption might be false.
Despite our quibbles, we realize that "discriminatory intent" is probably fixed in the vocabulary of
equal employment opportunity law.
191. Brennan v. Reynolds & Co., 367 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. I11. 1973).
192. Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F. 2d 307, 310 (6th Cir. 1975); Carpenter v. Continental
Trailways, 446 F. Supp. 70 (E.D. Tenn. 1978) (age must be"one of the determinative factors"); Mastie
v. Great Lakes Steel Corp.,424 F. Supp. 1299 (E.D. Mich. 1976). See also 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(c) (1979)
("determining factor").
193. Kentroti v. Frontier Airlines, 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 364,370 (10th Cir. 1978); Coates v.
National Cash Register Co., 433 F. Supp. 655 (W.D. Va. 1977); Wilson v. Sealtest Foods, 501 F. 2d 84,
86 (5th Cir. 1974).
194. 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1519 (D. Colo. 1976),affd, 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 364(10th Cir.
1978).
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undisputed testimony that Kentroti's supervisor denied his requests for a
seniority number as a pilot, saying that Kentroti was "too old" to be a pilot.
Furthermore, the company stipulated that it had a policy of hiring younger
individuals as pilots when available. Nevertheless, the trial court entered
judgment for the company, relying on the evidence that Kentroti was
ineligible for a pilot's seniority number under the collective bargaining
agreement. Here age appeared to be a factor, but the court apparently
chose to disbelieve the supporting evidence to comply with the "one factor"
standard. The flaw in the most stringent requirement is more obvious
since, if applied, it could permit a defendant to use age as the determining
factor and still escape liability, as long as the defendant could offer other
reasons, however inconsequential, to support its action. Consequently, the
"sole factor" test could defeat the remedial purpose of the Act and
undercut its enforcement.
What the ADEA calls for is a variant of the middle position. For the
purpose of applying the ADEA to the course of human events, the most
useful approach to the problem of multiple factors is to assume that it is
always one of two factors that influenced the employer's choice: the
employee's age or reasons other than the employee's age. Even if the
employer assumed that the employee was too old to perform the job
adequately, it serves no purpose to grant relief when the employer would
have reached the same decision without considering the employee's age.
The Supreme Court adopted an analogous rule under the first amendment
in Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle:195 an employee is not
entitled to reinstatement, even though his constitutionally protected
speech was a motivating factor in the employer's decision to discharge him,
if the employer can show that he would have been discharged even if he had
not spoken out. 196 Since it is unlikely that the Court would be more
protective of rights under the ADEA than of rights under the first
amendment, one can only conclude that age must be the determining
factor-that is, the real reason-for the defendant's decision. In other
words, an unfavorable decision is permissible unless the employer would
not have made the decision but for the employee's age.197
2. How the Defendant Can Respond
The defendant may respond to the plaintiff's claim in either of two
ways. First, it can deny the plaintiff's allegations by disputing that the
plaintiff was protected by the Act, that it made an unfavorable decision, or
that age was the real reason for the decision. Second, it may admit that age
195. 429 U.S. 274 (1977). The Court has already applied the reasoning of Mt. Healthy to Title
VII. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 368 (1977).
196. The burden of persuasion shifts to the employer on this issue. 429 U.S. at 287. We use Mt.
Healthy' here solely as a test of causation. See Part IV (B)(1) infra.
197. Cf. Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F. 2d 1003 (1 st Cir. 1979) (but for defendant's "motive to
discriminate" because of age). We disagree with the Loeb formula only if it prevents the trier of fact
from basing liability on "unconscious" assumptions about age. See note 190 supra.
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was the reason, but assert an affirmative defense: either that it was
necessary to base the decision on age, or that it was merely observing the
terms of a good faith seniority system or employee benefit plan.
B. How the Plaintiff Proves Age Discrimination
The facts that the defendant has treated the plaintiff unfavorably and
that the plaintiff was within the age range protected by the Act are easily
proven and ordinarily stipulated before the trial begins. Usually, the
plaintiff's problem at trial is proving that the defendant made its decision
because of the plaintiff's age. Although it can be difficult for a plaintiff to
prove what a defendant was thinking in any type of suit, it can be especially
hard in age discrimination suits.
During the legislative process culminating in enactment of the ADEA, it was
widely observed that in contrast to race discrimination, there is virtually no
consciousness of prejudice with regard to age, except as it relates to job
ability. . . .One implication of this difference is that detecting the presence
of age discrimination on the job will often be difficult. 198
Age bias may be consciously concealed or may lie hidden in the defendant's
untested assumptions about older workers.
Direct proof of age discrimination is hard to come by. It is
increasingly rare that a worker is told he is "too old" for ajob. Rarer still is
a defendant's written admission that age is the reason for an employment
decision. Consequently, to bring order to a trial in which the plaintiff can
offer only circumstantial evidence of the defendant's reasoning-and
probably to ease the plaintiff's burden of producing such evidence-the
Supreme Court has announced formulas for establishing a prima facie case
of unlawful discrimination.
1. The Prima Facie Case and Evidentiary Burdens
"Considerable confusion has attended [judicial] opinion discussions
of the prima facie case and burdens of proof under the ADEA."' 99 This
confusion is understandable. The Supreme Court has never discussed the
order and allocation of proof under the ADEA, only under Title VII.
Consequently, the lower courts have had two questions to answer: (1) how
does Title VII allocate the burden of proof, and (2) given the different
natures of race and age discrimination, should this allocation apply
nevertheless to suits under the ADEA? The answer to the second question
is that the burdens are the same under both statutes. Our answer to the first
requires a closer look at the Supreme Court's decisions.
The Supreme Court first addressed the allocation of proof in a private
suit alleging race discrimination in hiring in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green.200 The Court placed the "initial burden" of establishing a prima
198. Note, Business Necessity and the ADEA, supra note 189, at 578 n.62 (citations omitted).
199. Marshall v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 554 F. 2d 730, 735 (5th Cir. 1977).
200. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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facie case of discrimination on the plaintiff. It did not define what "prima
facie" meant, but it did provide an illustration of the elements of a prima
facie case:
(i) that he [the plaintiff] belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and
was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii)
that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejec-
tion, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek appli-
cants from persons of complainant' s qualifications.
Once the plaintiff has made this showing, the Court continued, the "burden
of proof' shifts to the defendant, and the defendant must "articulate some
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for its action.202 The plaintiff must
then "be afforded a fair opportunity" to show that the proffered reason is
merely a pretext for unlawful discrimination.0 3
The problem with McDonnell Douglas is its use of the term "burden
of proof." As Professors James and Hazard have pointed out, "the term
'burden of proof is used in our law to refer to two separate and quite
different concepts"; 20 4 there is the burden of production and the burden of
persuasion, which are also called the burden of going forward and the risk
of non-persuasion. A party with the burden of production on a given issue
"must introduce sufficient evidence to justify a verdict in his favor .. .on
each of the propositions of fact which he must establish as part of his
case." 20 5 In other words, the party must produce enough evidence to avoid
a directed verdict.20 6 Whether a party has met the burden of production is a
question of law-the court decides it.20 7 The burden of persuasion, on the
other hand, allocates the risk of loss when the trier of fact cannot reach a
conclusion. If the trier of fact, having heard all the evidence on an issue, is
uncertain which way to decide, the party with the burden of persuasion
loses. 20 8 Whether a party has carried the burden of persuasion is a question
of fact-the trier of fact decides it.
209
In any suit, the burdens of production and persuasion are allocated by
law. The plaintiff does not always bear the burden of persuasion on all
issues in a case, and even when he does, the defendant may still have the
201. Id. at 802.
202. Id. at 802-03.
203. Id. at 804.
204. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.5 (2d. ed. 1977).
205. Id. at § 7.7.
206. The standard used by the Sixth Circuit is typical. Whena party moves for a directed verdict,
the court must construe the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the opponent, draw all
reasonable inferences from the evidence, and then determine whether it raises a question for the jury.
Morelock v. National Cash Register Corp., 586 F.2d 1096 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 906 (1978)
(on motion for judgment n.o.v.).
207. See MCCORMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 336 (2d ed. Cleary ed. 1972).
208. The degree of uncertainty permitted depends on the standard of proof. In civil cases the
standard is usually a preponderance of the evidence. Under this standard, if the evidence is in equipoise,
the party with the burden of proof loses.
209. See MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 336 (2d ed. Cleary ed. 1972).
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burden of production on some issues. Indeed, "there is no satisfactory test
for allocating the burden of proof in either sense or [on?] any given
issue."210 Lower courts interpreting McDonnell Douglas have been free to
rely on policy and intuition when deciding what the Supreme Court meant.
At least four courts of appeals have ruled that both the burden of
production and the burden of persuasion shift to the defendant once the
plaintiff has made out a prima facie case under Title VII.21' By comparison,
the courts of appeals are apparently unanimous in ruling that only the
burden of production shifts under the ADEA. 2  One commentator has
defended this difference in results on policy grounds.
2 13
More recent Supreme Court decisions have made it clear, however,
that only the burden of production shifts under Title VII. The Court
continues to use the imprecise term, "burden of proof, '21 4 but its intention
is apparent. A Title VII plaintiff carries the burden of persuasion on "the
ultimate factual issues," but during the course of the trial, the burden of
producing evidence to establish or rebut those issues shifts back and forth.
This was the ruling announced in Teamsters v. United States,21 5 the most
helpful statement yet on burdens of proof under Title VII. In that case the
Court clearly distinguished between the plaintiff's initial burden of
establishing a prima facie case and the burden of persuading the trier of
fact that "there was a pattern or practice of such disparate treatment and, if
so, [that] the differences were 'racially premised.' ,,216 Once the plaintiff
210. F. JAIES & G. HAZARD, supra note 204, at § 7.8. Three common reasons for allocating the
burden of proof to a party are (1) access to information (i.e., the one who knows the most about a fact
should bear the burden of proving that fact); (2) the general idea that the accusing party should be
responsible for establishing his allegations; and (3) the notion that events normally follow a pattern and
one who claims that something out of the ordinary has occurred should be responsible for proving that
claim.
211. Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,90 HARV. L. REv. 380,389 n.54
(1976). The Note cites four appellate court decisions, three of which are in fact ambiguous on which
burden (i.e., the burden of persuasion or the burden of production) is shifted to the employer. Only
Vulcan Soe'y v. Civil Service Comm'n, 490 F.2d 387, 393 (2d Cir. 1973), clearly shifts the burden of
persuasion, and then only on the issue of whether facially neutral criteria are actually job-related. By
comparison, the Third Circuit only shifts the burden of production. Scott v. University of Del., 601 F.
2d 76,80 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 148 (1979); Whack v. Peabody & Wind Eng'r Co., 595 F. 2d
190, 193 (3rd Cir. 1979); Rodriquez v. Taylor, 569 F. 2d 1231, 1239 (3rd Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 913 (1978).
212. Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F. 2d 1003 (Ist Cir. 1979); Schwagerv. Sun Oil, 591 F. 2d 58 (10th
Cir. 1979); Cova v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 574 F. 2d 958 (8th Cir. 1978) (burden of persuasion
"reverts" to plaintiff, but defendant only bears the burden of production); Bittar v. Air Canada, 512 F.
2d 582, 583 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam); Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F. 2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975).
Some district courts have also shifted the burden of persuasion to defendants. Marshallv. Arlene
Knitwear, Inc. 454 F. Supp. 715, 728-29 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Schulz v. Hickok Mfg. Co., 358 F. Supp.
1208 (N.D. Ga. 1973). On the other hand, one court has required the plaintiffto establish a prima facie
case by a preponderance of the evidence, Murnane v. American Airlines, Inc., 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
285 (D.D.C. 1979), while another has simply refused to apply McDonnell Douglas to an age
discrimination suit. Marshall v. Hills Bros., 432 F. Supp. 1320, 1325-26 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
213. Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,90 HARv. L. RFv. 380,388-99
(1976).
214. See Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567,577 (1978); Albemarle Paper Co.
v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
215. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
216. Id. at 335-36.
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meets its initial burden, the defendant has the "burden of rebutting the
inference [of discrimination] raised by [the prima facie showing]. 217 The
Court's opinion evidently shifts the burden of production on the discrete
factual issue of whether race was the reason for the unfavorable treatment.
This reading of Teamsters is buttressed by the Court's apparent ruling that
the defendant's response to the prima facie case was insufficient as a matter
of law. 18 Meeting the production burden, as was noted above, is a
question of law. Further support is found in Board of Trustees of Keene
219State College v. Sweeney, in which the Court, reversing the First
Circuit's ruling that the defendant had to prove it lacked "discriminatory
motive," observed that
[w]hile words such as "articulate," "show," and "prove," may have more or
less similar meanings depending upon the context in which they are used, we
think that there is a significant distinction between merely "articulat[ing]
some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason" and "prov[ing] absence of
discriminatory motive." . . . [T]he Court of Appeals appears to have
imposed a heavier burden on the employer than Furnco [Construction Corp.
v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978),] warrants.220
This "significant distinction" is identical to the difference between carrying
the burden of production and the burden of persuasion on this issue.
In allocating the burden of production, the Supreme Court has
(perhaps unconsciously) followed the pattern of what Professors James
and Hazard call the "orthodox view" of presumptions.221 Under this view,
the plaintiff must produce enough evidence to allow the trier of fact to infer
the existence of the disputed fact-for example, discrimination based on
race. Once the plaintiff has met this burden-that is, has made out a prima
facie case-his version of the dispute is presumed to be true unless the
defendant produces evidence to the contrary. 2  According to the
orthodox view, 23 if the parties produce conflicting evidence, the
presumption drops out of the picture and the trier of fact is free to assess all
the evidence produced on the issue. The "presumption" is merely a device
for shifting the burden of production. The McDonnell Douglas decision
conforms with this view. After the defendant has articulated its legitimate
reason, the burden of production does not revert to the plaintiff: the
224plaintiff is not required to produce evidence on the sub-issue of pretext.
217. Id. at 339.
218. Id. at 342 n.24. In Furnco the Court ruled that the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case
"as a matter of law." 438 U.S. 567, 575 (1978).
219. 439 U.S. 24 (1978) (per curiam).
220. Id. at 25.
221. F. JAMFS & G. HAZARD, supra note 204, at § 7.9.
222. Id.
223. In ajury trial under the ADEA, the jury would never be instructed on the prima faie case or
the burdens of production or persuasion.
224. The plaintiffis given an opportunity to produce evidence of pretext, but he is not required to
do so. 411 U.S. at 804. Thus, the First Circuit was incorrect in suggesting that the judge should instruct
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This means that a directed verdict will not be entered against the plaintiff if
he fails to put on evidence to show that the employer's explanation is a
pretext. The trier of fact may still disbelieve the defendant's reasons and
find for the plaintiff on the basis of the prima facie showing of unlawful
discrimination.
2. Elements of the Prima Facie Case and the Use of Statistics
Although the Supreme Court has followed the pattern of presump-
tions in allocating the burden of production, it has not created a formal
presumption, that is, it has not prescribed a particular set of facts as the
sole formula for creating a presumption or inference of discrimination.
When the Court announced its McDonnell Douglas formula, it cautioned
that the decision "is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing
factual situations., 225 The Court asks only for "evidence adequate to create
an inference that an employment decision was based on a discriminatory
criterion illegal under the Act.
226
In the absence of direct proof,227 the Court has accepted two types of
prima facie showings of individual acts of discrimination. The first is the
McDonnell Douglas formula, which requires the plaintiff to "demonstrate
at least that his rejection did not result from the two most common
legitimate reasons on which an employer might rely to reject a job
applicant: an absolute or relative lack of qualifications or [in the context of
hiring or promotion] the absence of a vacancy in the job sought."228 The
second possibility is to establish that the defendant had engaged in a
pattern of unlawful discrimination, from which a court can infer that a
given employment decision was a part of the pattern.229 In practice, the
second formula is usually satisfied by statistical evidence combined with
evidence of particular acts of discrimination,230 but it may properly be
satisfied by statistical evidence alone.
The best summary of how a plaintiff can satisfy the burden of
production under the ADEA is found in Moore v. Sears, Roebuck and
the jury that the employer's evidence dispels any inference of discrimination unless the plaintiffshows
pretext. See Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979).
225. 411 U.S. at 802, n.13.
226. 431 U.S. at 358. "A prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas raises an inference of
discrimination only because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not
based on the consideration of impermissible factors." Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567,
577 (1978).
227. Direct proof (testimony by an observer of the fact in dispute) usually satisfies the burden of
production. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 204, at § 7.11. Cf Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 358, n.44
(McDonnell Douglas formula does not require direct proof).
228. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44.
229. Id. at 359.
230. See, e.g., Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co.,
424 U.S. 747 (1976); Marshall v. Sun Oil, 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 257, 260 (5th Cir. 1979). Fora
discussion of sophisticated statistical methods involving single and multiple variables in employment
discrimination cases, see E. JONES, CONDUCTING POLITICAL RESEARCH 91-135 (1971); Note, Beyondthe
Prima Facie Case in Enployment Discrimination Law: Statistical Proof& Rebuttal, 89 HARv. L. REV.
387 (1975).
1980]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Co.,231 a discharge case. To make a prima facie showing under Moore, the
plaintiff must produce evidence:
(1) that he was a member of the protected class; (2) that he was discharged; (3)
that he was qualified for the position he held; and (4) if, in addition, he (a)
shows he was replaced by a person younger than himself, (b) produces direct
evidence of discriminatory intent, or (c) produces statistical evidence of
discriminatory conduct.
232
But as good a summary as this is, it contains a flaw. If the plaintiff offers
direct proof that age was the reason for the decision, he need not establish
his qualifications as a part of his prima facie case; the plaintiff need only
prove his qualifications if he relies solely upon circumstantial evidence for
his prima facie showing. Only in that case, says the Court, is it necessary to
strengthen the inference of unlawful motive; direct proof alone satisfies the
burden of production on the issue of motive.33
Defendants often make two arguments in support of a motion for a
directed verdict when plaintiffs rely solely on circumstantial evidence. In
discharge or demotion cases, defendants argue, the plaintiff must show
that his replacement was not merely younger, but was under forty years of
age. So far the courts have thought little of this argument. "Accepting this
[view] literally would prevent [suits challenging] even blatant and willful
violations of the Act . . . as long as [the employer] had a replacement
employee who was over forty. 23 4 The more theoretical response is that
because "age is a relative rather than absolute status when taken as a basis
for discrimination, it need not follow that all persons protected by the Act
should be grouped together for purposes of delineating the extent of their
protection., 235 Age bias may properly be inferred from proof that the
replacement was younger than the plaintiff.
The second argument concerns the value of the plaintiff's statistical
evidence as a basis for inferring that age was the reason for the unequal
treatment. There is no general consensus on the weight to be given
231. 464 F. Supp. 357 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
232. Id. at 363.
233. To repeat our reasoning, to meet the burden of production, the plaintiff must produce
sufficient evidence on each of the "ultimate facts": (1) plaintiff's age, (2) an unfavorable employment
decision, and (3) age as the real reason for the decision. See Part IV(A) supra. Qualification for thejob
is not an"ultimate fact" under the ADEA, and direct proof that age was the reason for the employer's
action should satisfy the production burden. See note 227 supra. Therefore, if plaintiff can produce
direct proof, he should not suffer a directed verdict for failing to show his qualifications. His ability is
not an issue until the employer raises it in defense. Accord, Marshall v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
554 F.2d 730,736 (5th Cir. 1977). But cf. Marshall v. Airpax Elec., Inc., 595 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1979)
(per curiam) (despite evidence that company wrote "too old" on applicant's form, government failed to
make prima facie case when it failed to show that applicant was qualified or that ajob opening existed
when she applied). For the same reason, the plaintiffneed not show that he was replaced by a younger
worker. Bonham v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 187, 195 (3rd Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821
(1978). Accord, King v. New Hampshire Dept. of Resources, 562 F.2d 80, 83 (IstCir. 1977) (Title VII).
234. Marshall v. Baltimore & 0. R.R. Co., 461 F. Supp. 362, 364 (D. Md. 1978).
235. Moore v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 464 F. Supp. 357, 366 (N.D. Ga. 1979). Contra, Pricey.
Maryland Cas. Co., 561 F.2d 609, 612 (5th Cir. 1977).
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236
statistical information. The Supreme Court has cautioned that, like
other types of evidence, "statistics are not irrefutable; . . . their use-. . ,,237
fulness depends on all of the surrounding facts and circumstances.
The kinds of statistical comparisons used in practice vary greatly. In
reorganization cases, in which there are many demotions or discharges,
one approach has been to take the age composition of the total workforce
before reorganization, then to compare the age composition of the group
of discharged workers to see if a disproportionately high number of older
workers were affected a.23  Another tack has been to make comparisons
using the average age of employee groups-for example, the average ages
of discharged versus retained employees,2 9 or the average age of a segment
of the workforce before and after a discharge or over the course of several
years.240  Where these comparisons have produced insubstantial
differences, the courfs have concluded that the statistics reveal only what
could be expected in a world free of age bias: that older workers tend to be
replaced by younger ones.2 41 By comparison, in challenges to promotion
practices, the use of statistics in reported cases is still rare. The Fifth Circuit
has ruled that, in order to establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff must
show both that only a small percentage of persons over forty were
promoted and that the percentage of persons over forty who were available
for promotion was substantially greater than the percentage of those over
forty who were promoted.242
236. For example, in Marshall v. Hills Bros., 432 F. Supp. 1320 (N.D. Cal. 1977), summary
judgment was granted for the employer, when the evidence showed that nine out of eleven fired
employees were within the protected age category, eight of them were replaced by younger employees,
the younger employee was always retained when there was a choice between which of two employees to
fire, and one termination was pretextual and in another there was a direct reference to the employee's
age. In contrast, the plaintiff prevailed in Carpenter v. Continental Trailways, 446 F. Supp. 70 (E.D.
Tenn. 1978), on facts not nearly as strong.
237. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 (1977).
238. See, e.g., Marshall v. Sun Oil Co., 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 257 (5th Cir. 1979); Walkerv.
Pettit Constr. Co., 605 F.2d 128 (4th Cir. 1979) (base may have been only supervisors, not entire work-
force; context was supervisor demotion); Moore v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,464 F. Supp. 357 (N.D. Ga.
1979).
239. Schwager v. Sun Oil Co., 591 F.2d 58 (10th Cir. 1979) (court apparently did not consider
this to be part of prima facie showing, despite 10 year difference in average age of two groups).
240. Paxton v. Lanvin-Charles of the Ritz, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (data
base increased 60% over seven year period, showing merely that newer employees tended to be younger
than the initial average); Hughes v. Black Hills Power & Light Co., 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1365
(D.S.D.), aff'd, 585 F.2d 918 (8th Cir. 1978) (difference of.36 years). But see Mistrettav. Sandia Corp.,
15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1690 (D.N.M. 1977) (prima faciecase established byshowing that mean age of
supervisors decreased from 36.3 to 34.9 years, while mean age of nonsupervisors increased from 36.1 to
41.4 yearsover 10year period); Schulzv. Hickok Mfg. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (average
age of district managers decreased from 53.4 to 40.75 after series of discharges).
241. Mastie v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 424 F. Supp. 1299 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Hughes v. Black
H ills Power & Light Co., 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1365 (D.S.D.), aff'd, 585 F.2d 918 (1978); Mistretta
v. Sandia Corp., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1690 (D.N.M. 1977) (90% of new hires under40 years of age
does not establish prima facie showing).
242. Lindsey v. Southwestern Bell Tele. Co., 546 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam). Davis v.
Califano, 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 272 (D.C. Cir. 1979), holds, first, that statistics alone may meet the
production burden on the motive issue, and second, that, when preparing statistical data on
promotions, the plaintiff need consider only the "minimum objective qualifications" needed for
promotion, not every conceivable factor that bears on the decision to promote.
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Statistics can also be a weapon for defendants. An employer may use
statistics showing his workforce to be racially balanced in response to a
prima facie showing of race discrimination in order to buttress his denial
that race was a factor.243 Of course, statistics can also help employers in
suits under the ADEA. In Rhoades v. The Book Press244 the discharged
plaintiff offered testimony that management wanted to "unload some of
the older help.,,245 The company responded in part with statistics showing
that, of the employees retained in plaintiff's department, 23% were older
than plaintiff.
246
V. DEFENSES
The ADEA contains four defenses. Two of the defenses are denials of
the plaintiff's claim and may have been written into the Act merely to
reassure jittery business lobbyists. It is lawful for a defendant to have
treated the plaintiff unequally if "the differentiation is based on reasonable
factors other than age. 247 It is also lawful for the defendant to discharge or
discipline an employee if the decision to do so is based on "good cause."248
The remaining two defenses are what lawyers traditionally label
"affirmative defenses:" the defendant affirms the plaintiff's claim that age
was the reason for the employment decision, but asserts that its use of the
classification was justified. The ADEA recognizes two justifications for
using age: first, when "age is a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business
249
and, second, when the defendant is observing
the terms of a bona fide seniority system or any bona fide employee benefit
plan such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan, which is not a
subterfuge to evade the purposes of this chapter, except that no such
employee benefit plan shall excuse the failure to hire any individual, and no
such seniority system or employee benefit plan shall require or permit the
involuntary retirement of any individual specified by section 631(a) of this
title because of the age of such individual ... .
A. The Burden of Persuasion
Our discussion of the burdens of production and persuasion in Part
IV tacitly assumed that the defendant was denying the claim of age bias,
and we concluded that the burden of persuasion remained with the
plaintiff. According to at least three courts of appeals, however, when the
defendant raises an affirmative defense, the burden of persuasion shifts to
243. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 580 (1978).
244. 458 F. Supp. 674 (D. Vt. 1978).
245. Id. at 676.
246. Id.
247. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1) (1976).
248. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(3) (1976).
249. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1976).
250. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (0(2) (Supp. 1979).
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the defendant. 251 The cases have not discussed a policy rationale for
shifting the burden under the ADEA; the courts seem satisfied with the
standard practice of shifting the burden of persuasion to the party who
asserts an affirmative defense. The Eighth Circuit's reasoning is typical:
"[T]he Company's admission that [the plaintiff's] removal was solely on
the basis of his age presents a per se violation .. .of the Act. In
attempting to implement the [bona fide occupational qualification]
exemption . . . .the Company has the burden of proving its actions were
within the scope of the exemption.,
25 2
B. Substantive Issues
1. Age-Related Factors
Perhaps the most difficult task that litigators must face under the Act
is to separate the trinity of age discrimination: age, ability, and cost. When
an older worker is discharged, the employer most frequently defends its
action by pointing to the worker's relative lack of ability. The worker may
either be capable, but inferior to the replacement, or incapable of handling
basic responsibilities or producing enough income to justify his salary. 3
When the defendant relies on one or more purportedly objective
evaluations of the plaintiff's performance, counsel must scrutinize the
criteria used. Supervisors may have been asked to rate the plaintiff on such
qualities as "ability" and "versatility," and they may reveal age bias if they
consistently evaluate the oldest workers to be the weakest in these areas.254
Defendants may also rely on the relative training levels of older and
younger workers, but if the defendant postpones or denies training to older
workers and directs only the younger workers to take the courses, the use
of training to treat workers differently is unlawful.255 Although employers
may use test results as a basis for decisions, if the tests do not adequately
predict job performance, they may violate the Act by favoring "test-wise'
younger employees.
256
251. Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 553 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 966(1978); Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267, 1271 (4th Cir. 1977); Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510
F.2d 307, 313 (6th Cir. 1975).
252. 553 F.2d at 564.
253. Compare Mastic v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 424 F. Supp. 1299 (E.D. Mich. 1976); and
Stringfellow v. Monsanto Co., 320 F. Supp. 1175 (W.D. Ark. 1970) (capable, but inferior), with Loeb
v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979); and Donnelly v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 12 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 417 (D.N.J. 1974) (worker produced less income than company paid him in salary.).
254. The inherent danger of age bias in this type of evaluation may be reduced if the employer
expressly considers experience, length of service, or even age over forty as favorable qualities. See, e.g.,
Gill v. Union Carbide Corp., 368 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Tenn. 1973).
255. Coates v. National Cash Register Co., 433 F. Supp. 655 (W.D. Va. 1977). In reaching its
decision the court noted: "[Younger men were often chosen for this training over the older employees
because the older men were more experienced and useful to NCR. Even when older men were chosen,
their usefulness to the company frequently made it impossible to schedule them for the course." Id. at
658-59. In finding that the training level was directly related to the age of the employees the court may
have ignored the legitimate cause of the disparity in training and relied solely on the fact of disparity.
Nonetheless, there was other evidence that the company's defense of the disparity was a pretext.
256. 29 C.F.R. § 860.104 (1979).
1980]
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL
The most pressing issue of the near future may well be the use of direct
financial cost-the sum of the employee's salary and benefits-as a basis
for employment decisions. In a literal sense, the use of this datum is not age
discrimination since age is not the only factor that determines how much a
worker is paid. But seniority or length of service is probably the most
common reason why workers performing comparable tasks are paid
different sums, and common sense tells us that seniority and age are closely
linked.
So far, the direct cost issue has arisen only in discharge cases, as might
be expected. Three approaches have been taken. The approach least
favorable to older workers permits employers to use direct cost as a basis
for discharge whenever it is "faced with a reduction in force. 257 A more
favorable approach to older workers was developed in Marshall v. Arlene
Knitwear, Inc.: "[W]here economic savings and expectation of longer
future service are directly related to an employee's age, it is a violation of
the ADEA to discharge the employee for those reasons. 2 '58 Here the
worker's higher salary was the result of raises earned over seventeen years,
so the court ruled in her favor. But the decision can be limited by its facts:
the employer made no showing that it had a financial need to reduce its
workforce. In fact, the evidence suggested that the employer was trying to
cheat the worker out of her pension. The third and final approach, like
Janus, looks in both directions. Donnelly v. Exxon Research and
Engineering Co. 259 holds, in dictum, that it would be unlawful for an
employer to discharge an older worker doing satisfactory work simply
because a younger, equally qualified person would do the samejob for less
pay. 26 But it rules that it is proper for the company to fire a worker whose
productivity has declined in value to less than 75% of his salary.26'
From a policy standpoint, it is reasonable to let a company fire a
worker who is not "paying his own way." At the same time, the Donnelly
rule allows the employer to define satisfactory work, which could lead to
undesirable results. For example, suppose two workers, earning $20,000
and $40,000, are thirty- and fifty-years-old respectively. The older worker's
better pay is the result of annual merit raises, merit meaning a year of
successful service at the same position. If the company defines satisfactory
work to mean production of 125% of salary, the two must produce,
respectively, $25,000 and $50,000 per year. It is obvious who will be fired
257. Mastie v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 424 F. Supp. 1299, 1318-19 (E.D. Mich. 1976). The
Mastie decision is unpersuasive. The court reached the odd conclusion that, although the Act forbids
"general assertions" that older workers are more expensive to employ, the employer may apply this
belief to discharge an unlimited number of older workers following "individual assessments." Id. at
1318. The ADEA does not forbid assertions, it forbids companies from applying these assertions to
their workers.
258. 454 F. Supp. 715, 728 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
259. 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 417 (D.N.J. 1974).
260. Id. at 421-22.
261. Id. at 420.
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first in a poor business year, even if both produce an equal amount. This
result makes the initial dictum in Donnelly a hollow promise, and seems
inconsistent with the ADEA's purpose of promoting "employment of
older persons based on their ability rather than age.,
262
The ADEA is not silent on this problem, but it speaks only in
whispers. The Act does not permit an age-based refusal to hire or an age-
based decision to retire a worker, even if these actions could save the
employer additional costs in its benefit plans. 263 It seems incongruous to
give employers free rein to discharge workers when their direct-cost
criterion can be so closely related to age. Yet it can be an equally serious
burden to deny a financially-strapped company the right to lay offits more
expensive workers. It will be a challenge to the courts and Congress to
develop a solution that is sensitive to both of these concerns.264
2. Age as a Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ)
When used as a BFOQ, age is almost always used as a generalization
about an employee's ability, substituting for an individualized evalua-
tion.265 The effect of using age in this way is to deny employment
opportunities to capable older workers, in order to screen out incapable
workers. For example, if a city could lawfully require active-status firemen
to be under sixty years of age, even a hundred certificates of good health
would not help a qualified sixty-one-year-old to get the job. In a sense,
BFOQ's require older workers to suffer from the risk that individual
evaluations will not accurately predict capability.
Congress has decided to allow this loss of job opportunity whenever
the use of age is "reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the
particular business. 266 The implementation of this standard has left the
courts confused and the commentators frustrated. The courts have relied
on Title VII precedents with varying degrees of faithfulness, 267 and the
commentators are undecided whether these precedents should be followed
more closely or abandoned. 268 Disagreement has focused on theory as well
262. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1976).
263. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (Supp. 1979).
264. One good suggestion of how this might be done is found in Note, Business Necessity and the
ADEA, supra note 189, at 587-95.
265. An employer may set a maximum hiring age if it can prove that no person can work for the
company long enough for the company to recoup the investment it made in training. For example, ifit
takes the company at least five years to recoup its investment, and has a mandatory retirement age of
70, it could set age 65 as a hiring limit without making any assumptions about a worker's ability.
Sometimes statistical averages are used to support this claim. See, e.g., Murnane v. American Airlines,
Inc., 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 284,291 (D.D.C. 1979) (argument based on safety, not cost). Averages
are generalizations about ability, and, although they mayjustify a BFOQ, attorneys must be careful not
to let averages prove too much.
266. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1) (1976).
267. Compare Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.,499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,419
U.S. 1122 (1975) (relatively faithless), with Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 553 F.2d 561(8th
Cir. 1977) cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1978) (relatively faithful).
268. Compare Player, Defenses Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act:
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as practice, over policy as well as proof. The theory or policy side of the
problem boils down to two questions. The first is whether any method of
individual screening is as accurate as the BFOQ in detecting who is able to
perform the job safely and properly. In the rare situation in which an
employer can prove age to be the best predictor, it ought to be able to use it.
If age is not the best method, the question becomes whether the alternative
method is too expensive or risky for the particular business to accept.
These questions seem to lurk behind the current judicial formula requiring
the BFOQ to be reasonably necessary to the essence of the business, as well
as a factual basis for believing all or substantially all of the group excluded
would be unable to do thejob safely or efficiently or that it is impractical to
deal with group members individually. 269 As for the practice or proof side
of the problem, there is a consensus on one point only: a BFOQ cannot be
based on stereotyping, untested assumptions, hunches, or intuition; it
must be supported by some empirical data.270 But the courts have not been
equally rigorous in demanding precise empirical bases for BFOQ's. 271
CONCLUSION
At the 1979 Midwest Labor Law Conference, Ronald J. James,
former Wage and Hour Administrator and now practitioner, observed
that counseling clients about the ADEA is still difficult, largely because
there is so little substantive case law to guide attorneys.272 We hope this
article will help practitioners foresee and avoid procedural problems, thus
freeing the courts to devote their energies to the interpretation of the
substantive mandates of the Act.
Misinterpretation, Misdirection, and the 1978 Amendments, 12 GA. L. REV. 747 (1978) (follow Title
VII), with James & Alaimo, BFOQ: An Exception Becoming the Rule, 26 CLEVE. ST. L. REV. I, II
(1977) (Title VII precedents inadequate).
269. Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1977); Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d
859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975). James and Alaimo disagree: "Only when
substantially all of the suspect group can be proven to be incapable, and there is no practical way of
sorting out the capable from the others, does it make sense to exclude the suspect group as a group."
BFOQ: An Exception Becoming the Rule, supra note 268, at 6 (emphasis in original).
270. Aaron v. Davis, 414 F. Supp. 453 (E.D. Ark. 1976).
271. See cases and articles cited in notes 265-70 supra; see also Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours,
Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976). See generally Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, 90 HARv. L. REV. 380, 400-10 (1976).
272. The Conference was held October 5 &6, 1979, in Columbus, Ohio. Some ofthe proceedings
are reported in 102 L.R.R.M. 143-48 (1979). A summary of Mr. James' remarks is reported id. at
145-46.
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